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In a competitive and international economic environment, tax competition and the 
use of tax havens is, and will continue to be, an important issue in relation to the 
Australian taxation system. In February 2004, the Australian Tax Office (ATO) 
published the report titled ‘Tax Havens and Tax Administration’ outlining the 
compliance strategies being undertaken to address the use of tax havens by 
Australian taxpayers. The Commissioner of Taxation outlined that in 2002-03 
approximately $3.8 billion flowed from Australia to tax havens. This paper will 
identify that perhaps one of the reasons the ATO perceives tax havens as a risk to 
revenue collection is that the $3.8 billion represents amounts that have been 
declared or that could be traced. The amount of undeclared or untraceable funds 
may be significantly larger. This paper will explore whether the use of tax havens by 
Australian taxpayers poses a genuine risk to revenue collection by analysing the 
extent to which tax havens are being utilised by Australian taxpayers in terms of data 
available from the ATO and other agencies. Additionally, this paper will discuss the 
concept of tax competition and whether or not the use of tax havens contravenes the 
objectives outlined in the Ralph Report (optimising economic growth, promoting 
equity and promoting simplification and certainty) or indeed international economic 
theory. This paper will finally analyse whether the Australian taxation system is 
“match fit” in terms of either legislative frameworks or administrative measures 
aimed at minimising the risk to revenue that the use of tax havens by Australian 
taxpayers poses.  
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Tax Havens and the Australian Taxation System –  




“Tax havens undermine the revenue base, tax havens are not fair. And ordinary law-abiding 
taxpayers are rightfully outraged by the use of off-shore tax havens to avoid paying 
Australian tax. This is why action against tax havens has been one of my top international 
priorities for many years.”1
 
In February 2004, the Australian Tax Office (ATO) published the report titled ‘Tax 
Havens and Tax Administration’ (the Australian Tax Haven Report) outlining the 
compliance strategies being undertaken to address the use of tax havens by 
Australian taxpayers.2 The Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner) outlined 
that in 2002-03 approximately $3.8 billion flowed from Australia to tax havens.3 This 
compares to $185 billion (2%) of total revenue collected by the ATO in 2002-03.4  
The publication of a specific report on the issue of tax havens indicates that the ATO 
perceives the use of tax havens as a significant risk to revenue collection. Although 
the flow of funds from Australia to tax havens represents a small percentage of total 
revenue collection, perhaps one of the reasons that the ATO perceives tax havens 
as a risk to revenue collection is that the $3.8 billion represents amounts that have 
been declared or that could be traced. The amount of undeclared or untraceable 
funds may be significantly larger. The ATO recognises that tax havens may be a tool 
to conceal assets and income that should be subject to tax in Australia, and this is 
an important issue from an Australian perspective and internationally.5  
 
The ATO perceives the use of tax havens as a risk to revenue collection and is 
directing valuable resources toward minimising this risk through a number of 
                                                 
1 Costello, P (2004). Excerpt from an address given by the Australian Treasurer the Hon Peter Costello at the 
Insurance Council of Australia Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 12 August 2004. 
2 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p4. 
3 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p4. 
4 Australia. (2005). Taxation Statistics 2002-03, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, p9. Table 2.4 outlines 
total revenue collection for the 2002-03 financial year from all sources as $185,044m. 
5 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, (ii). 
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strategies including the above-mentioned report, compliance strategies and a 
taskforce. It is imperative to determine whether this risk to revenue collection 
because of the use of tax havens is genuine and if so, to what extent.  
  
Since its release in 1999, there has been a great deal of comment relating to many 
of the specific proposals of the Ralph Report.6 However, the author is not aware of 
academic comment specifically in relation to how these proposals relate to the issue 
of tax havens from an Australian perspective. The Australian Tax Haven Report is 
the first Government document relating specifically to the use of tax havens since 
the Ralph Report some six years ago. It is therefore imperative that the proposals 
outlined in the Australian Tax Haven Report be explored in both the context of the 
Ralph Report, and also global economic trends. This analysis will help determine 
whether the use of tax havens poses a risk to revenue collection in Australia and 
therefore justifies the level of resources being directed to this issue by the ATO.  
 
This paper will initially explore the definition of a tax haven from both historical and 
contemporary perspectives and outline some of the common reasons taxpayers 
utilise them. The paper will then explore tax havens in the context of good tax 
design. This will involve identifying whether the use of tax havens impacts upon the 
elements of good tax design and also whether there is support for the argument that 
tax havens create unfair tax competition.  The Australian Tax Haven Report will then 
be analysed with the aim of identifying whether the use of tax havens by Australian 
taxpayers presents a significant risk to revenue or indeed weakens the elements of 
good tax design that were outlined earlier.  A number of recent Australian court 
cases will be discussed with the aim of highlighting the reasons taxpayers utilise tax 
havens and the effect on the elements of the taxation system. This paper will then 
identify and analyse the legislative and administrative strategies in Australia that are 
aimed at minimising the risks to revenue that the use of tax havens poses. Finally 
this paper will conclude by outlining major findings and identifying further research 
opportunities that were presented.  
                                                 
6 For Example: Gome, A. (1999). “The Ralph report: relief at last for the small-business sector” Business 
Review Weekly, 21(37): 38. 
Moshinsky, A. (1999). “The Ralph Report: the last nail in the coffin for trusts?” Taxation in Australia, 
34(5):254-256. 
Richards, R. (1999). “What the Ralph Report means” Law Society Journal, 37(10): 42. 
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What is a Tax Haven? – Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 
 
Worldwide, there is a plethora of legislation aimed at preventing taxpayers from 
avoiding the payment of tax. It has been argued that the introduction of tax 
avoidance legislation as well as the tightening of rules in relation to allowable 
deductions has led to a significant increase in the tax avoidance profession and the 
occurrences of tax avoidance.7 Tax concessions which are available within the 
taxpayer’s own jurisdiction can be referred to as “on-shore havens”. These “on-shore 
havens” such as film industry concessions, superannuation funds, trusts and 
companies, have in the past meant that only the extremely wealthy ever needed to 
consider the use of off-shore havens.8  It is thought that in the United Kingdom, this 
tradition seemed to disappear when marginal tax rates and interest in overseas 
investment, led to off-shore tax havens being useful to both the middle and upper 
classes.9
 
Jurisdictions that are commonly referred to as tax havens are often economically 
poor, small in population and physical size with few available natural resources.10 
These jurisdictions are commonly previous colonies of Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. It is thought that these ex-colonies 
were left without experienced administrators and that this is one of the reasons for 
their unsophisticated taxation systems.11 These jurisdictions often use their 
unsophisticated tax systems to attract capital and therefore revenue to their country. 
This is especially the case, and often necessary where natural resources are not 
sufficient to support the economy.  
 
                                                 
7 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, p5. 
8 Dwyer, TM. (2000). Harmful Tax Competition and the Future of Offshore Financial Centres. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 15 (1): 48-69. 
9 Dwyer, TM. (2000). Harmful Tax Competition and the Future of Offshore Financial Centres. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 15 (1): 48-69. 
10 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, at p28. 
11 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, at p28. 
  5 
Tax Havens and the Australian Taxation System – Are We “Match Fit”?  ATTA 2006  
The term “haven” is defined as meaning any place of shelter or safety.12 A tax haven 
could therefore be defined as a place where tax is sheltered. That is, investments 
are placed in a jurisdiction with little or no taxes and tax is avoided or minimised in 
the “home” jurisdiction. Thus, that investment is sheltered from tax. However, the 
practices of tax havens are much more elaborate than tax avoidance. Tax havens 
are a place not only for tax avoidance but also for tax minimisation, postponement 
and confidentiality of information.13 Many of the most popular tax havens promote 
both tax benefits and other benefits such as confidentiality of personal information. 
 
Ginsberg (1991) categorises tax havens into three groups each with their own 
inherent benefits. The first, are countries where there are little or nil relevant taxes, 
for example, the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas and Bermuda.14 Secondly, countries 
where there are no or little taxes on foreign sourced income like Hong Kong and 
Panama.15 Finally, countries where there are special tax privileges granted to certain 
types of companies or operations. Examples of this type of activity can be found in 
the Channel Islands, Liechtenstein and Monaco.16  
 
It has been argued that in order for the use of a tax haven to be beneficial to the 
company or individual it should be politically stable, have a stable currency with little 
or no exchange controls, banking secrecy and confidentiality with little or no 
regulation, good infrastructure and good facilities.17 For example, the taxation 
system of Afghanistan may offer some advantages for taxpayers of other 
jurisdictions; however its current political uncertainty would make it unattractive to 
most foreign investors.18 The particular type of tax haven that is sought by a 
taxpayer will depend on the types of activities the taxpayer is involved in and the tax 
laws of their “home” jurisdiction.  
 
                                                 
12 The Concise Macquarie Dictionary. “haven” noun meaning (1) a harbour or port (2) an inlet of a sea or river 
mouth where ships can obtain good anchorage (3) any place of shelter and safety. 
13 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p3. 
14 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p3. 
15 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p3. 
16 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p3. 
17 The Report of Offshore Financial Centres and Services, The OFC Report 1993 (1993), Campden Publishing, 
Hong Kong, Page 120 – 124. 
18 Afghanistan relies heavily (70%) on goods and services taxation rather than direct taxation. The Ministry of 
Finance of Afghanistan concedes that compliance with taxation laws is very low and there is very little 
voluntary compliance. www.mof.gov.af 
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The OECD released a report in 1998 outlining strategies aimed at eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices (the OECD 1998 Report). The report outlined a number of 
criteria, which would be used to classify a jurisdiction as a tax haven. These criteria 
were that the jurisdiction had no or nominal taxes, there was a lack of effective 
exchange of information and lack of transparency and that the jurisdiction had no 
other substantial business activities.19 The criteria used in this definition are 
consistent with the reasons that taxpayers seek to utilise tax havens that were 
discussed previously.   
 
Jurisdictions with nil rates of tax or nominal rates of tax on certain income or certain 
entities are said to meet this first criteria. This means that a jurisdiction may have a 
nil corporate tax rate, nil payroll tax or nil individual tax rates or impose nominal tax 
rates in place of the nil rates. As this criterion is a gateway criterion, jurisdictions that 
are thought to have nil or nominal rates of tax on certain income will only be 
classified as a tax haven if any or all of the other criteria are apparent. Table 1 at the 
end of this paper contains a list of example jurisdictions that met the OECD’s criteria 
for a tax haven in 2000 and also highlights those who have yet to commit to the 
elimination of these practices.  
 
Lack of effective exchange of information refers to the exchange of information 
between governments where cross border transactions are involved. Governments 
can’t always rely on domestic sources of information to ensure that their own tax 
laws are being complied with. The exchange of information between tax authorities 
is seen as an effective means of deterring and discovering any non-compliance 
where cross border transactions are concerned. In a jurisdiction where there are 
laws to prevent the exchange of financial information, the ability of the other country 
to determine non-compliance and criminal activity is seriously eroded. An example of 
this is an Australian case involving a taxpayer claiming deductions from an 
investment in Vanuatu. During the hearing of the case, the Government solicitor 
expressed the impossibility of obtaining information about the Vanuatu resident 
company. 20  
 
                                                 
19 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p23. 
20 FCofT v Spotless Services Limited and Anor (1996) ATC 5201. 
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In jurisdictions where there is a lack of transparency, the taxation laws are not 
applied on an open and consistent basis among similar taxpayers and there often 
lacks information to determine a taxpayer’s situation. Lack of transparency of 
information can be indicated by “secret” tax rulings, negotiated tax rates for special 
taxpayers and inadequate or no regulatory and government supervision. 21 Any lack 
of transparency again makes it difficult for other countries to obtain information about 
a taxpayer and therefore apply their own tax laws effectively. 
 
Often tax haven jurisdictions require that a taxpayer not conduct business activities 
within the jurisdiction. In this scenario or where on the whole, the jurisdiction lacks 
any substantial business activities by its taxpayers, there is said to be no substantial 
activities. 22 The lack of such activities often indicates that a jurisdiction may be 
attempting to attract investments and transactions that are purely tax driven. It also 
indicates that the jurisdiction may not be able to provide a viable commercial 
environment for business activities. 
 
One of the major arguments for the elimination of the practices of tax haven 
jurisdictions has been the perceived criminal element that they attract. Governments, 
society and the media have tended to link tax haven jurisdictions to criminal and 
money laundering activities. Perhaps the reason for this is the confidentiality laws 
present in these jurisdictions. Why would a taxpayer seek to ensure their personal 
and income information is kept secret unless they had something to hide? In reality 
almost every jurisdiction has financial privacy laws which protect people from the 
unauthorised release of personal information.23   
 
In the United States, the government, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) each independently assess the extent to which 
jurisdictions have the potential to attract transactions linked to criminal activities. In 
relation to assessments undertaken in 2001, there appears to be no link between 
criminal financial activity and tax status. The United States government list shows 
fifty-two jurisdictions as areas of primary concern, however, just fourteen of these 
                                                 
21 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p23. 
22 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance,  at p23. 
23 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 
122:10-15. 
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are classified by the OECD as tax havens. It should be noted that Australia is listed 
as a primary jurisdiction for money laundering vulnerability on this list.24 Further 
research is required in order to determine why this is the case. The IRS grants 
“qualified intermediary” status to jurisdictions that have adequate laws for obtaining 
personal information of account holders. Of the OECD list of thirty-five tax havens, 
nineteen have received this “qualified intermediary” status including such major 
financial centres as the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas and the Channel Islands.25 
The CIA has published similar studies. Only four of the thirty-five OECD tax havens 
appear on the CIA’s list of suspected money laundering centres.26 These 
independent assessments show that there may not be evidence to support the 
assertion that tax haven jurisdictions attract a larger share of transactions linked to 
criminal activities. It has been argued that a country’s taxation system has no 
concrete link to criminal activities, money laundering or terrorist activities.27 One of 
the reasons for this is that criminals tend to be reluctant to travel “offshore” (which 
would eventually be required to physically set up and obtain funds) because of the 
added risks airports and customs officers create.28
 
This part analysed some of the characteristics of tax haven jurisdictions in terms of 
how specific practices relate to the criteria that were used to identify tax havens. The 
analysis highlighted the fact that many tax haven jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation with the purpose of attracting income and capital which would otherwise 
be difficult to obtain. This part also analysed the perception that tax havens are a 




                                                 
24 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 122, 
at p12. 
25 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 122, 
at p11. 
26 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 122, 
at p11. 
27 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 122, 
at p15. 
28 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 122, 
at p11.  
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Tax Havens and Good Tax Design 
 
Adam Smith first set the foundation of what constitutes a good tax system by putting 
forward his four canons of taxation: ‘equality’, ‘certainty’, ‘convenience of payment’, 
and ‘economy in collection’.29  Adam Smith’s ideals have over time evolved into 
modern taxation theory, which consists of four main criteria that are used to evaluate 
tax systems: equity, simplicity, certainty and neutrality. 
 
A recent example of the notions of good tax design being applied in an Australian 
context can be seen in the Ralph Report. In outlining its purpose, the Ralph Report 
states that Australia should have a taxation system, which equips it for the coming 
decades of unparalleled change.30 In addressing this, the Ralph Report outlined the 
notion of national taxation objectives upon which all decisions relating to changes in 
taxation law or administration should be measured against. These objectives are 
optimising economic growth, promoting equity and promoting simplification and 
certainty.31  
 
In any jurisdiction, the sole authority to collect taxes rests with the governing power. 
This is often referred to as sovereignty and is often one of reasons why problems 
arise in international taxation. This concept of sovereignty means that jurisdictions 
should only be concerned with levying taxes within their own jurisdiction and should 
not have the “sovereign right” to levy taxes within another jurisdiction. Why should 
the governing powers of Vanuatu use their limited financial resources to assist the 
Australian government to levy taxes in a jurisdiction they do not have any 
sovereignty over? From Australia’s perspective, it could be argued that we are not 
asking for any sovereignty, rather only information that is required to correctly 
calculate tax payable within our own jurisdiction.32 So, in recognising sovereignty, it 
is argued that a jurisdiction should be free to have policies of low or no direct taxes if 
                                                 
29 Adam Smith (1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 5th edn 1789, Norman S 
Berg Publisher, pp 777-778. 
30 Australia. (1999). Review of Business Taxation: A Tax System Redesigned. Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, p1. 
31 Australia. (1999). Review of Business Taxation: A Tax System Redesigned. Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, p104. 
32 Gaffney, M. (1998). International Tax Competition: harmful or beneficial?. Offshore Investment, 90: 40-44, at p41. 
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it chooses. Conversely, it has also been argued that scrutinising the intent of 
legislators when evaluating the laws of a country breaches both common law 
principles and the rule of law.33
  
Principles of good tax design and sovereignty are therefore all important factors to 
consider when analysing any aspect of taxation. There are arguments that tax 
havens serve a beneficial role in the global economy in that it has been said that tax 
havens provide a type of sanctuary from jurisdictions which themselves contravene 
taxation objectives by taxing too much and being overregulated.34 The question is 
then which dealings (if any) with tax havens impair the integrity of the tax system? 
 
Many of the activities undertaken through tax havens are legitimate dealings. For 
example, setting up a company in a tax haven jurisdiction does not itself constitute 
tax avoidance. It may be the case that the jurisdiction is proximate to the home 
jurisdiction or has an attractive banking sector. If the benefits of using a tax haven 
are the reduction, postponement and confidentiality of tax matters, then there could 
be a variety of motivations for using them. The individual or company may come 
from a jurisdiction where tax rates are relatively high and the use of a tax haven is 
merely a form of “bargain hunting”.35  For example, the taxation treatment of 
inheritance income, trust income, estate income and capital gains varies 
substantially throughout the world. In Australia, gifts of money or property are 
generally not taxable under income tax provisions where the gift is genuine. 
However, in New Zealand if a taxpayer makes gifts valuing more that $27 000 in a 
12 month period, they are liable to pay gift duty at marginal rates up to 25%.36 The 
benefit of confidentiality of information might be sought for both legal and criminal 
reasons. The protection of assets from creditors and family members is one reason 
a taxpayer might require confidentiality of their information. Also, a taxpayer might 
require secrecy due to the types of activities they are involved in. Political 
considerations also need to be considered, as it may be the case that an individual 
or corporation is unable to hold wealth in their country of residence or are unable to 
                                                 
33 Gaffney, M. (1998). International Tax Competition: harmful or beneficial?. Offshore Investment, 90: 40-44, at p42. 
34 Adams, C. (2002). An Historian Looks at Tax Havens, [cited 24 June 2004]. Available from 
http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0305g.asp. 
35 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p3. 
36 New Zealand, Estate and Gift Duties Act (1968). 
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trade with a particular country.37 The use of tax havens within close proximity to 
large economies also makes the possibility of international expansion easier and 
less costly.38 Finally, if taxation costs are taken to form part of the overall costs to the 
individual or corporation, then reduction of these costs would result in a more 
competitively priced product in the home country.39
 
Previous studies by the OECD and the Australian Government have explored the 
possible risks associated with the use of tax havens.40 One of the major areas of 
concern identified by both was that the use of tax havens affects the criterion of 
neutrality. The neutrality of economic decision making between taxpayers is 
seriously distorted by the fact that some taxpayers can use tax havens to avoid or 
reduce tax, while others do not or cannot.41  
 
Australian markets need foreign capital and the opportunities to create products in 
markets where the costs of resources such as capital and labour are more 
competitive. 42  Therefore it follows that taxation should be a factor that needs to be 
considered when Australian market participants are making decisions regarding 
investment. This illustrates that although neutrality as a criterion of good taxation 
system design can potentially be weakened through the use of tax havens, it is also 
a factor which has the potential to increase the competitiveness of Australia’s capital 
market.  
 
It is argued that the criterion of equity is also affected by the use of tax havens in the 
same manner as outlined above. A taxation system which allows taxpayers to 
reduce tax payable through the use of tax havens is highly inequitable. For example, 
if taxpayer derives income wholly within Australia, they will be liable for Australian 
tax on this income. Inequities would occur where a taxation system allows for 
                                                 
37 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p3. 
38 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p3. 
39 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p3. 
40 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1987) International Tax Avoidance and Tax 
Evasion: Four Related Studies, Paris: Public Affairs Division).and also Australia. (1985). Reform of the 
Australian Taxation System: Draft White Paper, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, at pp77-78. 
41 Fraser, P. (1989). Australian Tax Haven Measures. Australian Tax Forum, 6 (1): 101 
42 Fraser, P. (1989). Australian Tax Haven Measures. Australian Tax Forum, 6 (1): at p102. 
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taxpayers to utilise the tax status and confidentiality laws of tax havens in order to 
reduce or avoid the amount of Australian tax that would have been payable.  
 
One possible solution to the problems of neutrality and inequity that are created by 
the use of tax havens is for all jurisdictions to remove direct taxes thereby removing 
the incentive to utilise a tax haven for tax purposes. However, in relation to this 
point, it is submitted that historic ideologies and large public expenditure 
commitments mean that most jurisdictions which rely on direct taxes could not 
consider removing income taxes even if they wanted to.43 Further, it is submitted that 
if a jurisdiction took the approach of increasing neutrality and reducing inequities by 
removing income taxes, then by their own definition, they would be classified as a 
tax haven. 
 
The element of certainty is also affected where tax havens are utilised by taxpayers. 
From the earlier analysis of the characteristics of tax havens it was clear that 
anonymity, secrecy and non-detection were often driving factors in terms of the use 
of tax havens. It is therefore submitted that where any or all of these factors are 
present, the certainty of revenue collection is weakened. The ATO cannot be certain 
that income tax revenue will be collected if it is unable to obtain taxpayer or income 
details from these jurisdictions. This idea will be explored later as it relates to 
Australia’s administrative measures. 
 
If the use of tax havens can affect the elements of equity and neutrality at such a 
fundamental level, why then, for so many years have taxpayers continued to use 
them? It is submitted that the use of tax havens creates wealth. It has been said that 
in the case of the United States, foreign investors are able to purchase and invest in 
United States corporations, real estate and bonds with the wealth they have created 
from the use of low-tax bases.44 This stimulates the economy to a great extent and 
their own capital market might be affected should the use of tax havens be 
prohibited. Another reason is that products produced by many multinational 
corporations would be selling for a much higher price if it weren’t for the use of tax 
                                                 
43 Gaffney, M. (1998). International Tax Competition: harmful or beneficial?. Offshore Investment, 90: 40-44, at p41. 
44 Ginsberg, A.S. (1991).Tax Havens. New York: New York Institute of Finance, at p11. 
  13 
Tax Havens and the Australian Taxation System – Are We “Match Fit”?  ATTA 2006  
havens. Therefore the final cost of prohibiting tax havens might eventually fall on the 
consumer regardless of the government’s efforts to avoid it. 
  
The OECD holds the belief that low taxing regimes create unfair tax competition and 
that tax competition is harmful.45 The basis for this argument follows from the 
problems of neutrality and equity that were outlined earlier. However, the concept of 
national sovereignty means that the OECD cannot directly force other jurisdictions to 
change their laws. The OECD has taken the view that using financial threats, 
inducements, or restrictions on trade is a valid way of eliminating tax competition 
without breaching national sovereignty.46  
 
It was asserted earlier that tax haven jurisdictions are within their sovereign right to 
impose taxes (or not) as they see fit.  Most OECD jurisdictions are able to 
demonstrate that having a system that allows for the sharing information as well as 
having systems that protect the privacy of its taxpayers is an entirely achievable 
task.47 However, is pressuring a jurisdiction to enter into exchange of information 
agreements (treaties) really what some commentators would call “economic 
bullying”? 48 Many tax haven jurisdictions are simply places that have no direct taxes 
and rely heavily on consumption type taxes. For this reason they have no need to 
enter into exchange of information agreements. Because most OECD countries rely 
heavily on direct taxes and tax both domestic and overseas income of their 
taxpayers, the need for exchange of information and international co-operation is 
created.49 Who is benefiting from “forcing” these jurisdictions from entering into 
these agreements?  
 
If one takes the view (as many economists do) that low taxing jurisdictions are 
another form of economic competition, then are the tax advantages of these 
                                                 
45 Dwyer, TM. (2000). Harmful Tax Competition and the Future of Offshore Financial Centres. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 15 (1):51. 
46 Dwyer, TM. (2000). Harmful Tax Competition and the Future of Offshore Financial Centres. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 15 (1):51. 
47 Australia is an example of an OECD country, which has substantial privacy laws regarding the release of 
financial and personal information, yet also is able to enter into agreements for the sharing of information with 
other countries. 
48 Lambert, I. (2000). Tax Information Exchange- Offshore jurisdictions looking for a place to stand. Offshore 
Investment, at p14 “most off-shore jurisdictions see no benefit in these treaties because other governments 
increasingly want to tax assets and activities outside their own country”. 
49 Gaffney, M. (1998). International Tax Competition: harmful or beneficial?. Offshore Investment, 90: 40-44, at p41. 
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jurisdictions any different than any other resource advantage another jurisdiction 
might have.50 Australia might have a resource advantage in the form of wool which 
allows us to be internationally competitive in this market. How is a tax advantage in 
another jurisdiction any different to this?  
 
If a new supplier comes into the market and takes some of your market share, any 
losses that you suffer because you projected based on the current situation may 
appear real, but this view is unrealistic because you do not have any legal right to 
market share that is simply projected.51 The same can be said for tax competition in 
that countries cannot expect to be protected against projected revenue lost through 
a new competitor entering the market. 
 
An argument which supports the view that tax havens do have a place in the global 
economy is that the practices of these tax haven jurisdictions are really a form of 
economic competition and that in terms of taxation this competition is a natural 
process, which can eventually stop inefficient taxes of other jurisdictions.52 It makes 
economic sense for governments of these tax haven jurisdictions to take advantage 
of inefficiencies in other jurisdictions taxation systems. 
 
This section has argued that the use of tax havens by taxpayers threatens a good 
tax system by weakening equity, neutrality and certainty as elements of good tax 
design. A tax system which influences companies and individuals to elaborately 
structure their affairs so as to include tax havens and reduce or minimise tax is not 
neutral or equitable. Further, it is not politically responsible or fair to allow the burden 
of tax to fall on its resident payers or to allow any of criminal or avoidance activity to 
continue unpunished. It is also argued that the use of tax havens will also eventually 
make the tax system more administratively complex and inflexible as the 
government attempts to reduce their use.  The argument that tax havens create 
unfair tax competition was also highlighted. However, it is apparent that there are a 
number of flaws with the argument of tax competition being unfair. There are 
certainly valid arguments that tax competition is not unlike any other form of 
                                                 
50 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, at p29. 
51 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, at p43. 
52 Dwyer, TM. (2000). Harmful Tax Competition and the Future of Offshore Financial Centres. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 15 (1): 48-69, at p52. 
  15 
Tax Havens and the Australian Taxation System – Are We “Match Fit”?  ATTA 2006  
economic competition. It is submitted that the use of tax havens by Australian 
taxpayers does in fact weaken the Australian taxation system in terms the Ralph 
Report goals of being economically efficient (certain), equitable and neutral. 
However, it is also submitted that this fact alone forming the basis for the elimination 
of tax competition is flawed.  
 
 
The Australian Tax Haven Report 
This paper began by stating that the ATO had recently published the Australian Tax 
Haven Report and that in order to justify resources being directed to this area of 
taxation, it was imperative that tax havens be explored from an Australian 
perspective. So, why does the ATO see tax havens as a risk to revenue collection 
and how does this compare to the general perceptions of tax havens that have 
already been identified in this paper? 
 
Firstly, in terms of the definition of a tax haven, the ATO outlines that their definition 
of a tax haven is based on the criteria used by the OECD.53 These criteria were 
outlined earlier as a jurisdiction with; no or only nominal taxes, lack of effective 
exchange of information and lack of transparency. The ATO further states that they 
are “concerned about schemes and arrangements where taxpayers exploit the 
secrecy laws of tax havens in an attempt to conceal assets and income that are 
subject to tax in Australia.”54 From this it is argued that the ATO sees tax havens as 
a risk to revenue collection because they pose a threat to both certainty of revenue 
collection and equity of taxation distribution. Certainty and equity were both outlined 
earlier as essential elements to good taxation design.  
 
Is this concern by the ATO justified? Statistics presented in the Australian Tax 
Haven Report show that in 2002-03, $3.8 billion flowed from Australia to tax 
havens.55 This compares to $909.2 billion flowing from Australia to other non tax 
haven jurisdictions.56 Is it acceptable that the ATO directs considerable funding and 
                                                 
53 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p2. 
54 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, pii. 
55 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p4. 
56 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p4. 
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indeed creates a dedicated taskforce toward tax havens when they represent only 
0.4% of total funds flowing from Australia? Further, the ATO concedes that of this 
percentage of funds flowing to tax havens, only a small percentage are thought to be 
illegitimate transactions aimed at avoiding paying Australian tax.57
 
These statistics have been prepared using Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) data and this data is the ATO’s primary source of data 
(along with information from other organisations and independent research) relating 
to taxpayers who may be utilising tax havens in an effort to avoid paying tax in 
Australia.58 AUSTRAC is an Australian federal government organisation whose 
primary goal is as an anti-money laundering regulator and providing financial 
transaction information to law enforcement and revenue agencies.59 The fact that 
ATO data has been supplied by AUSTRAC is important to note because as will be 
discussed later in this paper, transactions are only required to be reported to 
AUSTRAC by cash dealers (for example banks), where the transaction falls into one 
of three categories; 
- significant cash transactions - a transaction of $10,000 or more in Australian 
currency, or the equivalent of $10,000 or more in foreign currency, 
- international funds transfer instructions - an instruction for a transfer of funds 
that is transmitted into or out of Australia electronically or by telegraph, 
- suspicious transactions - any transaction which the cash dealer has 
reasonable grounds to suspect is relevant to criminal activity.60 
So, in theory, all international funds transactions are reported to AUSTRAC. This 
should therefore mean that the statistics reported by the ATO in relation to the flow 
of funds from Australia are reliable. However, the author submits that because these 
reports are from a third party relying on a combination of adequate computer 
systems and human employees, these statistics automatically become unreliable. It 
is therefore argued that due to the nature of dealings with tax havens in relation to 
secrecy and the purpose of avoiding taxation, many dealings with tax havens would 
                                                 
57 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p4. For 
example, of all the funds flowing out of Australia to Guernsey in 2001-02, 44% of these represented legitimate 
taxpayer dealings. 
58 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p11. 
59 The role of AUSTRAC as described on their website at www.austrac.gov.au 
60 The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. (2003).  Annual Report 2002-03, Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, and also the Financial Transaction Reports Act (1988). 
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not be conducted through cash dealers for the express purpose of avoiding 
detection. In fact, the ATO concedes this point, if somewhat obscurely, by stating 
relatively briefly that they are increasing their focus on detecting taxpayers who are 
operating completely outside of the taxation system.61
 
The Australian Tax Haven Report also outlines the specific arrangements that the 
ATO is concerned about in relation to tax havens. These arrangements are; 
investments in foreign life insurance policies, schemes that result in increased 
deductions, schemes relating to service fees paid to companies in tax havens, 
offshore loans, shareholder loans, self-managed funds, circular flows of funds, 
management fees paid to companies in tax havens, captive insurance and 
excessive purchase price schemes.62 Many of these types of arrangements have 
been previously discussed as posing risks to revenue collection. Interestingly, the 
Australian Tax Haven Report makes several references to the increased occurrence 
of taxpayers obtaining cash in Australia through the use of offshore credit or debit 
cards.63 It could be argued then, that the ATO might in the near future be required to 
follow in the footsteps of the United States in relation to these credit and debit cards, 
where due to the secrecy laws of the offshore countries involved, the IRS has begun 
pursuing personal information of cardholders obtained from MasterCard International 
(obtained through a court order) relating to 230,000 bank accounts in tax haven 
jurisdictions.64
 
Within the Australian Tax Haven Report, the ATO outlines the strategies being 
undertaken to investigate potentially illegitimate dealing with tax havens. These 
strategies are; 
- Focusing on the promoters (wholesales, retailers and advertisers) of tax 
haven based arrangements of the type previously identified and requiring 
them to provide additional material relating to their clients’ financial 
information, 
                                                 
61 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, at p14. 
The word obscurely is used in this instance because such an important point is made in the report as part of a six 
line paragraph and is not elaborated upon in any detail. 
62 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, pp9-10. 
63 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, pp9-11. 
64 Sharp, WM and Harrison, WT and Harty, SA. (2002). Post-11 September use of offshore Tax havens. Tax 
Notes International, 26(3): 351-360. 
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- Focusing on participants through utilising AUSTRAC data to identify potential 
taxpayers involved in tax haven arrangements. 
- Issuing offshore information notices requiring a taxpayer to provide 
information located outside Australia.  
- Entering into international information exchange agreements. Currently, 
Australia has entered into tax treaties with 40 countries; however this 
measure would indicate that the ATO hopes to increase the number of these 
treaties. 
- Entering into joint investigations with law enforcement agencies such as the 
Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police and the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission.65 
 
As its primary point of determining compliance strategies, the ATO utilises what is 
referred to as the Compliance Model (see Figure 1 next page). This provides a 
structured way of determining which type of compliance strategy is appropriate for 
particular classes of taxpayer. For example, the ATO’s philosophy is that the 
majority of taxpayers are at the bottom of the compliance model (ie. willing to 
comply) and therefore are worthy of a softer compliance approach. The strategies 
identified in the Australian Tax Haven Report appear to be those found at the top of 
the compliance model (ie. using the full force of the law or deterring by detection). 
These strategies would therefore be consistent with the type of taxpayer 
corresponding in the model. These taxpayers either don’t want to comply or have 
decided not to comply.  
                                                 
65 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, pp15-17. 
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Figure 1 – ATO Compliance Model66
 
 
As outlined at the outset, whether or not the Australian taxation system contains 
legislative frameworks or administrative measures (or both) that are aimed at the 
use of tax havens is one of the issues being addressed by this paper.  Although this 
question will be discussed later in the paper, it is interesting to note at this point that 
all of the strategies identified by the ATO in the Australian Tax Haven Report are 
administrative in nature. This is perhaps an early indication of the ATO’s perceived 
level of importance placed on administrative strategies over legislative strategies.  
  
It has become apparent from this discussion that the ATO sees the use of tax 
havens as a significant risk to revenue collection and therefore an area which 
requires a significant compliance focus. What is also apparent is that the ATO’s own 
data in relation to tax havens indicates that dealings with tax havens represent a 
very small percentage of total international dealings by Australian taxpayers. 
However, the possible unreliability of the ATO data being reported and the fact that 
the ATO themselves concede that there are taxpayers acting completely outside the 
taxation system, means that the actual flow of funds could be significantly higher. 
The author therefore argues that there is sufficient doubt in relation to the extent of 
the use of tax havens by Australian taxpayers to warrant further research in this area 
in order to determine exactly how many transactions go undetected. 
                                                 
66 The ATO Compliance Model and information relating to its implementation is publicly available at;  
http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/5704.htm 
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Recent Australian Tax Cases involving Tax Havens 
 
Prior to analysing legislative and administrative measures applicable to the use of 
tax havens, it is important to briefly outline some recent Australian tax cases 
involving tax havens. This section will show in a practical context how the 
characteristics of tax havens have been utilised by Australian taxpayers. It will also 
highlight some of the concerns regarding equity, neutrality and certainty that were 
discussed earlier. The cases mentioned in this section are based on a search of 
Australian tax cases involving OECD identified tax havens over the last ten years.67 
Some cases have been excluded where although a tax haven jurisdiction was 
involved, it wasn’t the central to the case. The analysis of each case will be based 
on how the types of tax advantages the use of the tax haven presented and how the 
ATO and courts applied the taxation legislation.  
 
The most commonly referred to Australian tax case involving the use of tax havens 
is the Spotless case.68 The facts in this case involved two Australian tax resident 
companies entering into agreements with banks in Singapore and the Cook Islands. 
The Cook Islands were identified earlier as meeting the definition of a tax haven due 
to their low tax rates and confidentiality laws. In this case, surplus funds of some $40 
million were eventually transferred to the bank in the Cook Islands for investment 
purposes. These funds generated interest income of $2.96 million. The tax payable 
in the Cook Islands on this interest income was $103,230 which was substantially 
less than what would have been payable had the funds been invested in an 
Australian financial institution. The Australian resident taxpayers contended that this 
interest income was not subject to Australian tax because it was sourced outside of 
Australia and had already been subject to tax in the Cook Islands. This is an 
example of how the low tax rates of the Cook Islands were utilised by Australian 
taxpayers to minimise the amount of tax that would have been payable in Australia. 
 
The ATO argued that the interest was sourced in Australian because the income 
used to generate the interest was initially sourced in Australia. The ATO also argued 
                                                 
67 There were a number of cases in the 1970’s and 80’s relating to tax havens [eg. Citibank Ltd v FC of T & Ors 
(1988) ATC 4714 and Esquire Nominees Ltd v FC of T (1973) 4114], however due to changes in Australia’s 
international tax laws since that time, these cases do not add value to the analysis. 
68 FCofT v Spotless Services Limited and Anor (1996) ATC 5201. 
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that this was a deliberate scheme to avoid paying Australian tax and that the anti-
avoidance legislation should apply to make the interest assessable in Australia.69 
Initially, the judgement in this case supported the taxpayer’s view that the interest 
was sourced outside of Australia and Part IVA did not apply because the ATO had 
not properly identified the scheme to which the legislation should apply.70 The ATO 
appealed the Full Federal court decision in 1996, and was successful. The Full High 
Court found that the Part IVA did indeed apply and that “a reasonable person would 
conclude that the taxpayers as their most influential purpose, and thus their 
dominant purpose, the obtaining thereby of a tax benefit.71
 
For the purposes of this paper, this case highlights two important issues. Firstly, that 
Australian taxpayers of considerable size and wealth are induced by the tax 
advantages those tax havens such as the Cook Islands offer. Secondly, that in a 
climate where the Government and the ATO appear to be concerned about the use 
of tax havens, one case involving a tax haven of physical proximity took nine years 
of legal debate to decide.72 In terms of compliance it is essential that the ATO 
continue to pursue transactions which it believes fall within the anti-avoidance 
provisions so that the integrity of the taxation system is upheld. 
 
In the case of Atkinson v FC of T (2000) a taxpayer was found to have non-disclosed 
a variety of income over a number of years including interest income from off-shore 
accounts in Port Vila, Vanuatu and Switzerland.73 The ATO became aware of this 
during an audit of the taxpayer. During the audit, the ATO inspected Family Court 
affidavits relating to the taxpayer’s divorce. These affidavits showed that the 
taxpayer was receiving substantial amounts of income from a variety of sources that 
had not been declared by the taxpayer.  Because of the ATO’s inability to access all 
the information required to determine the actual amount of income received, 
(particularly in relation to the off-shore income) the assessed income was based on 
the taxpayer’s spending during the years in question. The taxpayer appealed this 
method of calculation in the federal court and was unsuccessful. This case highlights 
                                                 
69 Part IV will be analysed in more detail in a further section. 
70 FCofT v Spotless Services Limited and Anor (1993) 93 ATC 4397 
71 FCofT v Spotless Services Limited and Anor (1996) ATC 5201 at para 5211. 
72 The interest was earned in the 1986/87 year of income and the final decision was handed down in December 
1996. 
73 Atkinson v FC of T (2000) ATC 4332. 
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another administrative measure available (audits) and the difficulty in obtaining 
information from off-shore jurisdictions. 
 
More recently, in the case of Hickman v FC of T (2005), a taxpayer entered into 
arrangements with two companies resident in Vanuatu.74 The arrangement was such 
that the taxpayer borrowed $500,000 from one company to purchase an annuity in 
the other company. Interest was payable on the loan at a rate of 12% and the 
payments from the annuity would not commence until 2028. The ATO was of the 
opinion that the whole arrangement was a “sham” and disallowed the interest 
deduction claimed of $60,000. The ATO also argued that the arrangement was of 
the kind relating to the creation of superannuation benefits and therefore because 
the entity was not a complying Australian superannuation fund, the interest was not 
deductible. The taxpayer appealed the ATO’s decision to disallow the deduction 
before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and was unsuccessful. The fact that the 
companies were incorporated in Vanuatu was referred to in the court proceedings 
where it was stated by the government solicitors that ‘it is impossible to make any 
check on companies registered in that country.” This case is an example of an 
Australian resident taxpayer setting out to utilise the confidentiality laws of Vanuatu 
in reducing Australian tax payable. From the evidence presented in court it appears 
that the taxpayer was relying on this inability to access information in ensuring that 
the deduction would be allowed. 
 
A similar arrangement is involved in the case of JMA Accounting Pty Ltd & Anor v 
Carmody and Ors (2004) and relates to the ATO’s ability to gain information about 
these types of arrangements.75 In this case, the ATO suspected an accounting firm 
located in Brisbane was actively involved in promoting schemes that utilised a tax 
haven (Labuan Province) in order to avoid the payment of Australian tax. The 
scheme involved Australian taxpayer clients claiming deductions for the acquisition 
of goods and services from an entity resident in Labuan Province. The ATO was of 
the opinion that the monies sent to Labuan Province did not constitute genuine 
acquisitions and that the monies were simply sent off-shore and then returned to the 
taxpayers less a small commission.  Initial investigations by the ATO revealed that 
                                                 
74 Hickman v FC of T (2005) ATC 2109. 
75 JMA Accounting Pty Ltd & Anor v Carmody and Ors (2004) ATC 4916. 
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approximately 70 transactions totalling $1.35 million were potentially utilising this 
scheme. The case is an example of taxpayers taking advantage of both the low tax 
rates and confidentiality laws of the tax haven jurisdiction to create false deductions 
and therefore minimise tax paid in Australia. The issue to be decided in this case 
was in relation to whether or not the ATO acted outside its legislative powers of 
access when it raided the premises of the accountant in search of evidence. The Full 
Federal Court decision was that the ATO did act outside its access powers and a 
substantial number of documents were to be returned to the accountant. The 
decision in this case highlights that where information is unable to be obtained from 
the off-shore jurisdiction, the ATO still faces some difficulty in gaining access to 
information that exists on-shore. The effects of this case on the ATO’s ability to 
disallow the deductions claimed is yet to be seen, due to this decision relating only 
to access powers being handed down in late 2004. 
 
It should be noted here that on 3 June 2005 the media reported that the ATO, the 
Australian Federal Police and other organisations had commenced proceedings to 
investigate and arrest persons in respect of a tax avoidance scheme utilising off-
shore tax havens.76 The unpaid tax is reported to amount to approximately $300 
million. The only information available in relation to this at present is media releases 
by the ATO, the Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission. From these 
releases it appears that these schemes are similar to the case analysed above. The 
outcome of these investigations is yet to be determined but highlights the importance 
of all the further research that has been suggested in this paper.  
 
The lack of cases concerning tax havens is surprising given the ATO’s apparent 
concern about the risk to revenue that tax havens pose. An explanation for this 
might be that many transactions involving tax havens that are detected by the ATO 
are resolved without the need for judicial intervention. It was highlighted earlier that 
the ATO sees the use of tax havens as a risk to revenue, yet statistical data did not 
necessarily support this view. The earlier argument was that statistical data relating 
to the use of tax havens did not provide a full picture as non-disclosure of income 
and the inability to effectively trace transactions was really the central issue. This 
                                                 
76 See ATO Media Release NAT 2005/35 and also “ATO, police swoop on rich tax evaders”, The Financial 
Review, 11 June 2005. 
  24 
Tax Havens and the Australian Taxation System – Are We “Match Fit”?  ATTA 2006  
lack of cases heard in relation to the use of tax havens would appear to support the 
view that taxpayers are more likely to non-disclose and the ATO is not able to trace 
information or transactions effectively.  
 
Australian Legislative Frameworks and Administrative Measures  
 
There are a number of measures the government and administrators of Australia 
could implement to ensure that the risk to revenue posed by tax havens is 
minimised. These measures are thought to fall into three broad categories; uni-
lateral, bi-lateral and multi-lateral.77  Multi-lateral measures refer to those involving a 
number of parties. These measures would include Australia being a member of the 
OECD and other international organisations such as the FATF. Bi-lateral measures 
refer to those involving one other party. These would be illustrated by the existence 
of agreements with another jurisdiction. The third category, uni-lateral measures 
refers to legislative and administrative measures that the Australian government as a 




An analysis of all Australian taxation legislation and relevant literature identified a 
number of legislative frameworks that could potentially apply to transactions 
involving tax haven jurisdictions. These uni-lateral measures have been identified 
as; source of income and residency rules, transfer-pricing rules, controlled foreign 
company rules, foreign investment fund rules and the general anti-avoidance 
provisions. Each of these legislative frameworks will be identified and holistically 
analysed in this section. 
                                                 
77 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, at p33. 
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Source of Income and Residency 
 
The most fundamental legislative frameworks are the general source of income and 
residency rules. The general residency rules operating in Australia are largely based 
on common law. This means that residency is generally decided on a case-by-case 
basis. Taxpayers who are Australian tax residents are liable for Australian tax on 
income and capital earned from both Australian and overseas sources.  Non-
Australian residents are liable for Australian tax only on income or gains that have 
an Australian source or are connected with Australia.78 In theory, the residence rule 
promotes capital export neutrality by subjecting Australian taxpayers to worldwide 
income. In this regard, these rules represent a legislative framework that is aimed at 
reducing the risk to neutrality and equity that the use of tax havens poses.  
 
So, from this it is argued that residency of a taxpayer and source of income needs to 
be determined when transaction involving tax havens are apparent. It has been 
argued that specific statutory source rules should be introduced in Australia in order 
to increase the efficiency and remove uncertainty.79 Taxpayers often try to establish 
themselves as non-residents for Australian tax purposes in order to ensure that 
foreign sourced income is not taxable in Australia. In circumstances where this non-
resident status cannot be obtained, an Australian tax resident is assessed on all 
income regardless of its source. Therefore, it is argued that the only option available 
to avoid paying Australian tax is to invest in foreign jurisdictions where secrecy laws 
make it difficult for income accumulated to be attributed to them. It has been argued 
that the fundamental principles of residence and source of income have created a 
tax-induced incentive for Australian businesses to invest in low tax jurisdictions.80 
Indeed it is also thought that unless Australia substantially overhauls its residency 
and source rules, it stands to lose a substantial amount of revenue.81 Further 
research is required in order to determine whether the residency and source of 
                                                 
78 Income Tax Assessment Act (1997) at s6-5. 
79Azzi, J. (1996). The Need for further reforms of Australia’s International Taxation rules in view of the 
Spotless case. Bulletin for Fiscal Documentation, 50 (4), at p176. 
80 Azzi, J. (1996). The Need for further reforms of Australia’s International Taxation rules in view of the 
Spotless case. Bulletin for Fiscal Documentation, 50 (4), at p173. 
81 Azzi, J. (1996). The Need for further reforms of Australia’s International Taxation rules in view of the 
Spotless case. Bulletin for Fiscal Documentation, 50 (4), at p164. 
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As identified earlier, the low tax rates of tax haven jurisdictions are often attractive to 
Australian taxpayers. Transfer pricing involves Australian resident companies 
incorporating service companies in offshore low-tax jurisdictions. The on-shore 
Australian resident company then pays an amount of money to the service company. 
The on-shore Australian resident company is entitled to claim a deduction in 
Australia for this payment on the basis that it is an amount paid for services provided 
in the course of business.82 Governments and administrators take issue with transfer 
pricing in situations where payments to service companies are inflated. In this 
situation, deductions available are often larger than the true value of these 
transactions. This also means that the service company is assessed on an inflated 
amount of income. If this service company is located in a tax haven jurisdiction, then 
being assessed on an inflated amount of income is often of no real concern. As the 
company is incorporated and controlled outside Australia, it is a non-resident for 
Australian tax purposes.  
 
The Australian tax legislation contains provisions that effectively ensure amounts 
paid by Australian resident taxpayers to these off-shore service companies are 
limited to the real value of these services and not an inflated amount.83 These 
provisions were introduced shortly after the OECD published a report in 1979 
outlining the problems associated with transfer pricing. These provisions are 
potentially activated where a taxpayer enters into an international agreement for the 
supply or acquisition of property or services and the consideration for the supply is 
either nil or less than the arm’s length consideration and the consideration for the 
acquisition is greater than the arm’s length consideration.84 If the later is found to 
apply then the Commissioner can exercise discretion so as to limit the amount of 
                                                 
82 Income Tax Assessment Act (1997) at s8-1. 
83Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) at Division 13 and also Taxation Ruling TR 94/14. 
84 Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) at s136AC, s136AD(1), s136AD(2) and s136AD(3). 
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consideration to what would be the arm’s length value of the transaction.85 The 
Australian provisions limiting available deductions in transfer pricing arrangements 
are aimed primarily at foreign-based multinational companies shifting profits outside 
the Australian taxation system.86 So, although it is apparent that the legislative 
framework available in relation to transfer pricing is applicable to the use of tax 
havens, further research needs to be undertaken in order to determine its 
effectiveness in this context. 
 
Controlled Foreign Companies 
 
The major legislative framework in relation to the use of tax havens by Australian 
taxpayers is the ‘controlled foreign company’ (CFC) regime.87 The broad objective of 
this regime is to tax Australian shareholders under an accruals basis on income from 
foreign companies that has not already been comparatively taxed offshore or which 
has not been derived from active overseas business activities.88 This means that an 
Australian resident taxpayer can potentially be assessed on income from a foreign 
company regardless of whether or not that company has actually distributed the 
income in the form of a dividend.  
 
The CFC rules came into effect from 1 July 1989 as a result of the Government 
being concerned about the deferral advantages of the previous foreign tax credit 
system.89 It is thought that the CFC rules are capable of alleviating these deferral 
problems which arise when an Australian resident company accumulates income in 
a foreign subsidiary so as to avoid being subject to Australian tax.90 Taxpayers are 
able to incorporate a foreign company and effectively control it from Australia by 
interposing another company (known as a CFC) between the source of income and 
the beneficial owners.91 In comparison to transfer pricing, where the focus was on 
                                                 
85 Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) at ss136AD(1)–(3). 
86 Fraser, P. (1989). Australian Tax Haven Measures. Australian Tax Forum, 6 (1): at p100. 
87 Contained in the Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) ss316-468. 
88 CCH Australia Ltd. (2004). Australian Master Tax Guide, CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney, at p21-110. 
89 The Treasurer. (1988). Taxation of Foreign Source Income: A Consultative Document, Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
90 Azzi, J. (1996). The Need for further reforms of Australia’s International Taxation rules in view of the 
Spotless case. Bulletin for Fiscal Documentation, 50 (4),  at p165. 
91 Azzi, J. (1996). The Need for further reforms of Australia’s International Taxation rules in view of the 
Spotless case. Bulletin for Fiscal Documentation, 50 (4),  at p173. 
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multi-national companies shifting profits outside Australia, the focus of the CFC 
provisions is to ensure that Australian based multinational companies do not leave 
profits outside Australia in order to avoid Australian taxation.92
 
The application of these rules directly affects the advantages associated with the 
use of tax havens in that all tax haven jurisdictions are not listed countries. Therefore 
any passive income derived by an Australian resident taxpayer from a CFC resident 
in a tax haven could potentially be attributed when it is actually derived.   
 
Although the Australian legislation regarding the taxation of CFC’s is said to be 
successful and one of the toughest regimes in the world, it is also thought to play a 
significant role in restricting foreign investment and encouraging Australian 
companies to move their operations completely off-shore.93 This is particularly 
concerning for Australia in light of earlier arguments about competition. If the 
Australian Government is genuinely concerned about becoming a competitive player 
in the global economy then it seems counterproductive to also have a taxation 
regime, which encourages corporations to move offshore. Additionally, studies have 
shown that in many jurisdictions, the introduction of similar CFC provisions did not 
yield the expected large amounts of revenue and that compliance costs to taxpayers 
were extremely high.94 At the time of their introduction, it was thought that the CFC 
rules constituted a significant improvement over the existing foreign tax credits 
system. However, it was also thought that in making this improvement, the overall 
problems of neutrality in terms of international investment would not be completely 
alleviated.95 From this analysis, it is submitted that although the CFC rules can apply 
to transactions involving tax haven jurisdictions, further research needs to be 
undertaken in order to determine its effectiveness in this context. 
 
Foreign Investment Funds 
From the above discussion, it became apparent that there would be situations where 
Australian resident taxpayers could derive income from tax haven jurisdictions that 
                                                 
92 Fraser, P. (1989). Australian Tax Haven Measures. Australian Tax Forum, 6 (1): at p100. 
93 Szekely, L. (2001). Tax Competition – An Australian Perspective, at p1. Available from: 
http://library2.cch.com.au/dynaweb/@CCH__Access/eitc/itc/frames/eitc.htm?cid=1802EF97DCF16EFE0E46E
28EB146nal Ltd and also n244 at p3. 
94 Fraser, P. (1989). Australian Tax Haven Measures. Australian Tax Forum, 6 (1): at p103. 
95 Fraser, P. (1989). Australian Tax Haven Measures. Australian Tax Forum, 6 (1): at p100. 
  29 
Tax Havens and the Australian Taxation System – Are We “Match Fit”?  ATTA 2006  
would escape the CFC rules because the foreign company would not be controlled 
by Australian resident taxpayers. The Foreign Investment Fund (FIF) rules were 
designed to overcome this gap in the legislation.96 Therefore, from July 1992, both 
income and capital gains from investments in FIF’s is to be attributed to the 
Australian resident taxpayer who owns the investment.97 This income is taxed 
similarly to that under the CFC rules in that the accruals method is used. The FIF 
provisions are designed to work in conjunction with the CFC provisions. The FIF 
provisions have been described as “clearly mop-up provisions… if they haven’t got 
you under the CFC provisions or the non-resident trust provisions, they will get you 
on FIF’s.”98
 
At the time of their introduction, it was estimated that the increase in tax collected 
from these measures would be around $150 million.99 Due to the broad nature of the 
FIF provisions and the fact that they do not specifically distinguish between foreign 
jurisdictions (i.e. no listed or unlisted countries), there are many exemptions.100 The 
main exemptions are for foreign entities already liable to pay tax under existing 
foreign source income rules, foreign entities to which the CFC provisions already 
apply and overseas investments of less than $20 000. This $20,000 threshold is 
thought to be a concession for small-scale investors.101 However, it is submitted that 
this threshold represents a potential weakness in relation to the use of tax havens. 
Large numbers of small scale investors may still amount to a significant risk to 
revenue in relation to tax haven jurisdictions. Also exempt under these provisions 
are investments of less than 10% in companies listed on an approved stock 
exchange and investments in an “active business”.102  
 
Once it is established that an Australian resident taxpayer has an investment in an 
FIF and that no exemptions apply, the legislation will attribute assessable income to 
                                                 
96 The Government was concerned that the CFC rules could be avoided through the promotion of small 
portfolio interests in companies that were resident in low tax jurisdictions. 
97 An FIF is any foreign company or trust, see s481 Income Tax Assessment Act (1936). 
98 Lyons, M. (1991). Tax Haven Net to Catch Minnows. Business Review Weekly, 6 September 1991, at p90, 
as stated by Peter Blackwood of Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu and former ATO branch chief. 
99 Lyons, M. (1991). Tax Haven Net to Catch Minnows. Business Review Weekly, 6 September 1991, at p90. 
100 Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) at ss503-527. 
101 Lyons, M. (1991). Tax Haven Net to Catch Minnows. Business Review Weekly, 6 September 1991, at p91 
by John Denyer (executive director Investment Funds Association of Australia). 
102 Lyons, M. (1991). Tax Haven Net to Catch Minnows. Business Review Weekly, 6 September 1991, at p90 
and also Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) at ss495-501. 
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that taxpayer using one of three methods; the market value method, the deemed 
rate of return method or the calculation method.103 The FIF provisions can therefore 
potentially apply to any income derived from a company or trust that is resident in a 
tax haven jurisdiction regardless of whether the company is controlled by Australian 
tax residents or the taxpayer has a greater than 10% ownership interest.  
 
There has been much debate around how equitable the provisions are. It has been 
argued that these provisions have the potential to levy tax on income that has not 
actually been earned.104 One commentator has even suggested that investors would 
be better off paying tax under the CFC provisions where they are not liable until they 
realise the gain and that it is “outrageous” to demand tax be paid on income that has 
not been received.105 The FIF measures have been described as like using a 
“sledgehammer to crack a nut”.106 In terms of this paper’s focus on legislative 
frameworks designed to minimise the risk posed by the use of tax haves, it is 
apparent that the FIF measures are applicable to certain transactions involving tax 
haven jurisdictions but further research is required in order to determine their 




The final piece of legislative framework that could potentially apply to limit the risk to 
revenue collection posed by Australian resident taxpayers utilising tax haven 
jurisdictions is the general anti-avoidance provisions. The provisions are commonly 
referred to as Part IVA and are contained in the Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) 
at sections ss177A – 177F. The aim of Part IVA is to assess and penalise taxpayers 
where it is found that; 
- the taxpayer has entered into a scheme, and 
- the taxpayer has obtained a tax benefit from that scheme, and 
                                                 
103 Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) at ss535 and 538,  ss543 – 557 and ss557A – 583. 
104 Lyons, M. (1991). Tax Haven Net to Catch Minnows. Business Review Weekly, 6 September 1991,at p90 
where Peter Knox from Ernst and Young says that “the Government and Treasury people do not fully 
understand what they are doing.” 
105 Lyons, M. (1991). Tax Haven Net to Catch Minnows. Business Review Weekly, 6 September 1991, a p90. 
106 Lyons, M. (1991). Tax Haven Net to Catch Minnows. Business Review Weekly, 6 September 1991, at p91. 
by Robert Goatly (managing director of GT management). 
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- it could be concluded that the taxpayer entered into the scheme for the 
purpose of obtaining that tax benefit. 
 
It is submitted that Part IVA is a legislative framework that is available to be applied 
to transactions involving tax haven jurisdictions. It was argued earlier that taxpayers 
are often attracted to use tax haven jurisdictions because of the tax benefits they 
provide. Therefore, prima-facie Part IVA could be effective in minimising the risk to 
revenue that tax havens pose. The Spotless case was analysed earlier and is an 
example of where Part IVA was utilised in order to assess in Australia a transaction 
involving a tax haven jurisdiction. It has been argued that the use of Part IVA in the 
Spotless case would have been unnecessary had the Australian taxation system 
contained specific legislative source rules.107 There would have been no need to 
establish a motive or purpose behind the transaction had the interest income been 
found to have an Australian source initially. 
 
Analysis of literature in relation to Part IVA revealed that it has been the subject of 
extensive academic research.108 However, it is thought that further research could 
be conducted in relation to how Part IVA specifically applies to transactions involving 
tax havens rather than its overall effectiveness. 
 
This part has identified the legislative frameworks within the Australian taxation 
system that can be implemented to ensure that income derived by Australian 
resident taxpayers is still assessable in Australia regardless of whether that taxpayer 
has utilised a tax haven jurisdiction for the purposes of avoiding tax. It is apparent 
that the identified legislation is wide-ranging and covers the types of tax haven 
transactions that were earlier identified as potential risks to revenue. Although 
beyond the scope of this paper, the author recognises that each one of these 
identified pieces of administrative measures needs to be individually evaluated as to 
whether or not it is successful in relation to the use of tax havens.   
                                                 
107 Krever, R.(1995). The Continuing Story of Tax Avoidance and the High Court: Peabody v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation. Just Policy  44 and also Azzi, J. (1996). The Need for further reforms of Australia’s 
International Taxation rules in view of the Spotless case. Bulletin for Fiscal Documentation, 50 (4),  at p176 
108 Examples of this academic research include; Boujous, J. (2003). Part IVA…no limit to its operation?, The 
Tax Specialist, Vol 7(1):27-37 and Richards, R. (1993). Part IVA read down yet again, Australian Accountant, 
Vol 6(7):60-61 and Cassidy, J. (1994). Part IVA – a tiger or toothless,  Revenue Law Journal, Vol 4(1&2):160-
181. 
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It is argued that the risks to revenue might be stemming from the fact that taxpayers 
must non-disclose in order to make transactions with tax havens beneficial in terms 
of taxation and is the reason why the following discussion on administrative 
strategies is important. One support for the argument that taxpayers are non-
disclosing rather than being forced to comply with broad and complicated legislation 
is that the ATO’s own figures show a relatively small amount of income flowing to 
and from tax havens. It is argued that there are simply too many taxpayers and too 
many transactions for the ATO to monitor all of them and computers have made it 
easier both for detection but for taxpayers to avoid tax. However, if a taxpayer is 
willing to non-disclose income generated through tax havens, why wouldn’t they 
save them selves some trouble and just non-disclose income generated in 
Australia? Perhaps this is because the taxpayers feel that the transactions do not 
genuinely belong in the Australian tax system, otherwise they would just non-




An analysis of Australian government reports, ATO reports and other literature has 
identified a number of possible administrative measures. The measures identified 
are; ATO intelligence, information gathered from AUSTRAC, information gathered 
from Australian Customs Service and criminal measures. These administrative 
measures will be analysed in the following section in order to identify ways in which 




The ATO asserts that its primary method of identifying transactions involving tax 
havens is through data collected and presented on tax returns and previously 
gathered taxpayer information.109 When a taxpayer provides information on a tax 
return or additional schedule of information, the ATO is often able to determine 
whether a tax haven jurisdiction has been utilised. Taxpayers are required to 
                                                 
109 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p1. 
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separately report income from foreign sources and investment income. The ATO is 
therefore able to determine whether the legislative provisions that were outlined 
earlier have been interpreted and applied correctly. The ATO performs risk analysis 
of all information provided by taxpayers in order to determine whether a taxpayer or 
transaction requires further investigation in the form of audit activities.110 In its 
compliance program for 2003/04 the ATO outlines that the following key strategies in 
relation to tax havens; 
- facilitating the exchange of information between administrators of tax 
havens, 
- increasing audit activities, 
- providing education and assistance to taxpayers about the risks 
associated with tax havens and taxpayer responsibilities, 
- undertaking risk analysis. 
 
Where intelligence gathered identifies a taxpayer or transaction requiring further 
investigation, the ATO is able to gather specific information from taxpayers or their 
associates through its ‘access of information powers’ contained in the Taxation 
Administration Act (1953) at section 264. It has been argued earlier that the very 
nature of confidentiality laws in tax haven jurisdictions has the potential to limit the 
effectiveness of ATO intelligence in identifying transactions involving tax havens. For 
example, in situations where the ATO believes that a taxpayer has been utilising a 
tax haven in order to avoid Australian tax, information to support this claim would be 
required to be obtained (under section264). In many situations this information would 
be located within the tax haven jurisdiction where access is limited due to the 
confidentiality laws which make the jurisdiction a tax haven. 
 
A number of further research opportunities present themselves in relation to the 
effectiveness of ATO intelligence in identifying transactions involving tax haven 
jurisdictions. Further research is required in relation to the number of taxpayers and 
transactions identified as relating to tax havens which result in amended tax return 
assessments being issued. Also, further research could be conducted in relation to 
the number of taxpayers or transactions which are identified as involving tax havens 
                                                 
110 Australian Taxation Office. (2003) Compliance Program 2003/04, Canberra: Australia at p45. 
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for which no further investigations were conducted. Although it is recognised that this 
information would be difficult to obtain due to the sensitivity of taxpayer information, 




As referred to earlier, AUSTRAC is an Australian federal government organisation 
whose primary goal is as an anti-money laundering regulator and providing financial 
transaction information to law enforcement and revenue agencies. It was argued 
earlier that one of the reasons why it may be difficult to ascertain the exact level of 
risk posed by tax havens is that information gathered by the ATO is often only 
information that has been or could be traced by AUSTRAC. It is submitted that 
information supplied by AUSTRAC plays a significant role in identifying those 
transactions which have fallen outside the ATO’s system. It was outlined earlier that 
information gathered by AUSTRAC from by cash dealers (for example banks), falls 
into one of three categories; significant cash transactions, international funds 
transfer instructions or suspicious transactions. An example of a suspicious 
transaction was when AUSTRAC released a circular to financial institutions outlining 
circumstances where a transaction may be utilised to finance terrorist activities.111
 
It is submitted that financial and time constraints of both organisations mean that not 
all transactions that are reported will be further investigated. This was the 
experience in the Unites States where law enforcement agencies reported difficulties 
in tracing up to 700,000 electronic money transfers involving about US $2 trillion per 
day.112 It was thought that the majority of these represented legitimate commerce, 
but administrative agencies lacked the tools to differentiate those which related to 
criminal or tax evasion matters.113 Financial institutions in the United States filed 
approximately 13 million currency transaction reports in 1999 with an administrative 
                                                 
111 The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. (2003).  Annual Report 2002-03, Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, the Financial Transaction Reports Act (1988) and see also The Australian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. (2003). Information Circular No.31, Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
112 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 
122: 10. 
113 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 
122:10-15. 
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cost to the industry of more than US$100 million. It is thought that less than 1/1000th 
of 1% of currency reports are ever used in a money laundering conviction.114  
 
It is also submitted that there are inconsistencies in some of the information 
exchanged between these organisations.115 Questions about the accuracy of this 
administrative technique of investigation were highlighted previously in relation to the 
fact that only certain entities are required to report information to AUSTRAC, and 
even then, only in relation to certain transactions. An example of how this 
information cannot necessarily be relied upon from the ATO’s perspective is that 
while the ATO reports that $3.8 billion flowed to tax havens from Australia in 2003-
03, media comments around the time of the release of the report stated that 
AUSTRAC data identified $9.1 billion leaving Australia for Switzerland alone.116 This 
identifies a potential weakness in this administrative measure.  
 
Although the previous analysis identifies a number of possible weaknesses in the 
system of transactions reporting, it should be noted that on the whole, AUSTRAC 
regarded highly as the international level and if often complimented for the way in 
which the system is constantly reviewed.117  In relation to transactions with tax 
haven jurisdictions that have a taxation purpose, it is concluded that AUSTRAC is a 
primary administrative measure. However, an area of possible further research has 
been presented in terms of the effectiveness of exchange of information between 
AUSTRAC and the ATO and also the role that financial constraints play in the ability 
to investigate transactions involving tax havens.  
 
Australian Customs Service  
 
The primary role of Australian Customs Service is managing the security and 
integrity of Australia’s borders.118 In relation to the use of tax havens, the role played 
by Customs Officers falls into both the categories of uni-lateral and multi-lateral 
                                                 
114 Mitchell, DJ and Quinlan, AF. (2001). Who are the real money laundering havens? Offshore Investment, 
122, at p13. 
115 Australian Taxation Office. (2004). Tax Havens and Tax Administration. Canberra: February 2004, p11. 
116 Gilchrist, M. (2004). Tax Haven Crackdown - ATMs used to tap into undeclared offshore cash, The 
Australian, 24 February 2004, at p1. 
117 Parker, D. (2000). Havens Forbid. Australian CPA, 70 (10): 33. 
118 See www.customs.gov.au 
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defence that were outlined earlier.119 It is submitted that in some cases, taxpayers 
utilising tax havens to avoid the payment of Australian tax, will physically follow their 
money either from or to the tax haven jurisdiction. In this regard, Australian Customs 
Service plays an important role. Persons entering Australia through immigration are 
required to declare to Customs Officers currency they are carrying which is equal to 
or in excess of $10,000 Australian dollars. Reports of these amounts are forwarded 
to AUSTRAC and dealt with in the same manner transactions reported by other 
financial institutions. It is submitted that this administrative measure plays a small 
role in identifying transactions involving tax havens because it is only applicable to 
one side of a transaction. This is supported by the fact that in 2002/03 Customers 
Officers reported 190 cases of undeclared currency excesses to AUSTRAC.120 In 
today’s electronic society it is also submitted that the number of persons gaining 
access to their funds in this physical manner would be substantially less than those 
obtaining access through electronic means such as electronic transfers and ATM 
cards. This has been the experience in the United States where it was identified that 
many taxpayers where utilising credit cards to gain access to their monies.121 
However, evaluating the level of risk posed by persons physically bringing money 




The Australian Federal Police, the National Crimes Authority, the Australian Crimes 
Commission and the Department of Public Prosecutions also play an administrative 
role where transactions involving tax havens are concerned. These organisations 
are called upon in limited circumstances. As at November 2003, only nine cases 
from the ATO had been referred to these avenues from projects undertaken by the 
ATO in 2002.122 It is submitted that because these organisations become involved 
after a taxpayer or transaction relating to tax havens is identified, they will not be 
discussed in detail as part of this project.  
 
                                                 
119 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, at p34. 
120 Australian Customs Service. (2005). Annual Report 2003/04, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. 
121 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, at p34. 
122 Fullarton, AR. (2003). A critical analysis of Tax-Avoidance Schemes in Australia, at p23. 
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The aim of this part was to identify and analyse the possible legislative frameworks 
and administrative measures that can be utilised in minimising the risks associated 
with the use of tax havens. It is argued that the number of these frameworks and 
measures that were identified illustrates that the Australian taxation system is 
equipped to minimise the risk to revenue that tax havens pose. However, the level of 




Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
 
The motivation for this paper was a direct result of the ATO issuing the Australian 
Tax Haven Report. This report made clear that the ATO was concerned about the 
risk to revenue that tax havens pose. The aim of this paper was to explore whether 
there is evidence to suggest that tax havens pose the threat that the ATO perceives 
and if so, whether the Australian taxation system contains legislative frameworks or 
administrative measures (or both) which are aimed at minimising this risk to 
revenue. It was discovered that the tax reasons behind the use of tax haven 
jurisdictions are often only one reason among many and that the protection of assets 
and personal information can often be overriding reasons. It was also apparent one 
of the reasons tax havens need to be considered carefully is that the livelihoods of 
many jurisdictions rely on the large financial sectors that have been built up over 
many years.  
 
In terms of good tax design, it was submitted that four criteria are generally used to 
evaluate a tax system; equity, simplicity, certainty and neutrality. It was concluded 
that both within Australia and globally, the use of tax havens poses potential risks to 
a number of these elements, but particularly to equity, neutrality and certainty. As a 
result of the Ralph Report it is apparent that the Australian government and the ATO 
see these criteria as paramount in evaluating the current taxation system and any 
future changes. It was concluded that in situations where taxpayers invest money in 
off-shore tax haven jurisdictions problems with equity and neutrality arise. It was also 
concluded that certainty is affected once funds leave Australian shores. It was 
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argued that these threats to equity, certainty and neutrality are much greater for 
taxation systems that rely heavily on direct taxes and common law principles of 
source and residency (such as Australia). 
  
The fundamental concept of sovereignty means that one jurisdiction cannot and 
should not play any part in determining how another jurisdiction should design its 
taxation system. From this, it was argued that the idea of tax competition being 
unfair might be fundamentally flawed. What right does the government of Australia 
have to demand that Vanuatu change its taxation system to protect its own tax 
base?  
 
This paper identified that Australia has a number of legislative frameworks which 
attempt to target dealings with tax havens. If the Australian taxation system contains 
legislative frameworks, which are aimed at preventing taxpayers from using tax 
havens to avoid paying tax, and the ATO still sees them as a potential risk area, 
then it was submitted that importance must be placed on the administration side of 
this issue. It was argued that if taxpayers want to benefit from the use of tax haven 
jurisdictions then they are most likely left with no other option but to not declare the 
transaction or income. This paper analysed the administrative tools available for 
detecting these types of transactions and ensuring that the legislative frameworks 
are complied with. It was argued that AUSTRAC has been recognised as having 
some of the best practices of transactions recording organisations in the world. 
However, it was also argued that there may be inconsistencies between data 
collected by AUSTRAC and by the ATO or that there was a lack of communication 
between the two agencies. It was argued that although AUSTRAC does have the 
technological capacity to track each and every transaction that occurs in Australia, 
there are physical and financial constraints in doing so. The ATO administrative 
powers were also analysed and it became apparent that although the ATO has 
made clear that it is concerned about the risks associated with tax havens, it is 
constrained in a number of ways. Firstly it is constrained by what is actually declared 
by taxpayers initially and ensuring that these amounts are actually in accordance 
with the legislation. It is also constrained by information which is provided by a third 
party (AUSTRAC) whose resources need to be apportioned between a number of 
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interested organisations. Finally, it is also constrained by its inability to obtain 
information from tax haven jurisdictions once finds have flowed there. 
 
The effectiveness of Australian legislation and administrative tools has been 
identified as an important opportunity for further research. Each of these legislative 
frameworks and administrative measures needs to be independently and 
quantitatively evaluated in order to determine the extent of their effectiveness in 
relation to minimising the risk to revenue that tax havens pose. However, one 
conclusion of this paper is that the effectiveness of both the legislative frameworks 
and administrative measures is limited largely by communication across 
organisations, the financial cost of tracing all transactions, and the constraints 
involved in tracking and obtaining information once it has left Australian shores.  
 
One of the questions that this paper has raised as a fundamental further research 
opportunity is why taxpayers are attracted to using tax haven jurisdictions in the first 
place? Taxation systems are increasingly becoming a competitive economic 
commodity. Tax competition is often referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’ where there 
are no winners in the end.123 However, as argued in this paper, there are valid 
opposing views about this.  
 
It is therefore argued that there must be something fundamentally unattractive about 
Australia’s taxation system that makes the use of tax havens a viable option for 
taxpayers. One of the solutions presented in this paper which requires further 
investigation is for Australia to embrace the idea of tax competition and become a 
competitive player in this field. As with any form of natural competition, taking such a 
view would mean that those countries with the “best” systems would start to be 
noticed and others would follow in their footsteps. It has been argued that this view 
would create a “race to the top”, which is far more attractive than a race to the 
bottom.124
 
                                                 
123 Dwyer, TM. (2000). Harmful Tax Competition and the Future of Offshore Financial Centres. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 15 (1): 48-69, at p52. 
124 Gaffney, M. (1998). International Tax Competition: harmful or beneficial?. Offshore Investment, 90: 40-44, at p44. 
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If Australia were to abolish all forms of direct taxation and rely solely on consumption 
taxes then there would be no financial benefit for taxpayers to utilise tax havens. 
This solution is one that should be further investigated in order to determine its 
ability to overcome many other inequities in our taxation system.   
 
This idea of removing direct taxation goes hand in hand with the idea of becoming a 
competitive player in the international tax market. It has been argued that one of the 
reasons many taxpayers in high-taxing countries find the idea of tax havens 
attractive is that they do not accept their tax systems as “fair” or equitable, and are 
therefore merely doing what they can to protect themselves and their families.125 If 
the taxation incentive of using tax havens was taken away through the abolition of 
direct taxation, it would then become clear that those taxpayers who continue to use 
tax havens would only be doing so for reasons other than tax. However, would the 
Australian government be prepared to take this drastic action of abolishing direct 
taxation? From the discussions in this paper this would, by definition, make Australia 
a tax haven itself. Also, would it be possible for the current level of social support to 
be continued to be provided without direct taxation? So, until this solution can be 
independently evaluated, it is therefore concluded that the Australian government 
and the ATO must accept that some jurisdictions are more competitive from a tax 
perspective. Therefore the legislative frameworks and administrative measures that 
are in place need to be utilised effectively. This will ensure that the risks associated 
with the use of tax havens will not be allowed to increase whilst there is complete 
and contemporary qualitative research undertaken to ascertain the reasons why 
taxpayers find the Australian taxation system so unattractive that they make the 
decision of utilising tax haven jurisdictions. 
                                                 
125 Dwyer, TM. (2000). Harmful Tax Competition and the Future of Offshore Financial Centres. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 15 (1): 48-69, at p53. 
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Table 1 – Initial Tax Haven Jurisdictions126
Andorra # 
Anguilla – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba – Kingdom of the Netherlands 




British Virgin Islands – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
Cook Islands – New Zealand 
The Commonwealth of Dominica 
Gibraltar – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
Grenada 
Guernsey/Sark/Alderney – Dependency of the British Crown 
Isle of Man – Dependency of the British Crown 
Jersey – Dependency of the British Crown 
Liberia # 
The Principality of Liechtenstein # 
The Republic of the Maldives 
The Republic of the Marshall Islands # 
The Principality of Monaco # 
Montserrat – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
The Republic of Nauru 
Netherlands Antilles – Kingdom of the Netherlands 
Niue – New Zealand 
Panama 
Samoa 
The Republic of the Seychelles 
St Lucia 
The Federation of St. Christopher & Nevis 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Tonga 
Turks & Caicos – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
US Virgin Islands – External Territory of the United States 
The Republic of Vanuatu 
                                                 
126 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2000).Towards Global Tax Cooperation: 
Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (the 2000 Report), Paris: Public Affairs 
Division, at p17. Those marked with # are those who were yet to commit to the OECD project as at 2004.  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2004). The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices: The 2004 Progress Report. 
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